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LIMITATIONS ON A MINOR'S RIGHT TO SUE FOR

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Under Massachusetts law, a minor has three years to initiate a
medical malpractice lawsuit from the date on which a medical malpractice
claim "accrues."' The accrual date has been interpreted to include a "discovery rule," meaning that the time during which the claimant can bring an
action begins on the date that one discovers the malpractice, rather than on
the date it occurs.2 If the malpractice occurs before age six, however, the
child has until age nine to bring an action.3 Accordingly, the statute of
limitations begins to run on the accrual or discovery date and lasts for three
years, unless the child is younger than age six when the4 malpractice occurs,
in which case the child has until age nine to file a suit.
In contrast, the statute of repose embodied in the same provision
runs for seven years from the date on which the malpractice occurs, regard-

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231,

§ 60D (2000). The minority provision currently states:

Notwithstanding the provisions of section seven of chapter two hundred and sixty,
any claim by a minor against a health care provider stemming from professional
services or health care rendered, whether in contract or tort, based on an alleged
act, omission or neglect shall be commenced within three years from the date the
cause of action accrues, except that a minor under the full age of six years shall
have until his ninth birthday in which the action may be commenced, but in no
event shall any such action be commenced more than seven years after occurrence
of the act or omission which is the alleged cause of the injury upon which such
action is based except where the action is based upon the leaving of a foreign object in the body.
Id.
2

See Harlfinger v. Martin, 754 N.E.2d 63, 67 (Mass. 2001) (noting cause of action

accrues when patient learns, or reasonably should have learned of harm); McGuinness v.
Cotter, 591 N.E.2d 659, 665 (Mass. 1992) (same); Franklin v. Albert, 411 N.E.2d 458, 45960 (Mass. 1980) (announcing discovery rule governs accrual of cause of action for medical
malpractice).
3 § 60D (maintaining three-year statute of limitations, except minor under age six
has until age nine).
4 See id.; Harlfinger, 754 N.E.2d at 67 (quoting Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514,
516 (Mass. 1982)) (explaining statute of limitations is time during which plaintiff can bring
a claim, or otherwise barred from so doing).
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less of whether the child has discovered the injury.5 Unlike statutes of
limitations for other tort claims in Massachusetts, the medical malpractice
minority provision does not toll the action until the minor reaches the age
of majority.6 Like the minority provision, the statutes governing an adult's
ability to bring a medical malpractice claim also include a three-year statute of limitations, which begins to run on the discovery date, as well as a
seven-year statute of repose, which begins to run on the occurrence date.7
The specifics of the minority provision are best illustrated by example. If, for instance, an obstetrician commits malpractice during a child's
delivery, but the child or his or her parent does not discover the injury until
age ten, the suit would be barred. This result is not due to the statute of
limitations because the three-year period would not start to run until the
malpractice was discovered at age ten. Rather, the seven-year statute of
repose, which began to run at birth when the physician committed the malpractice, would have expired three years prior to the patient's discovery of
the injury and would, therefore, bar the claim against the physician. This
example also illustrates the minority provision's rejection of tolling the
claim until the child reaches eighteen because the claim would be barred
even though the child is only ten years old.
Since its enactment, numerous plaintiffs have unsuccessfully challenged the minority provision's constitutionality. 8 This note examines
whether the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has properly rejected
such arguments. 9 Section II explores the history of the medical malpractice statute's minority provision, including the insurance climate at the
time of its adoption in 1975, reasons for adding the statute of repose in
1986, and the case law declaring its constitutionality. 0 Section III presents
decisions of other state courts that have struck down similar statutes and
their reasons for so doing." Section IV analyzes the constitutionality of
the Massachusetts statute and argues that the Supreme Judicial Court has

5 See § 60D; Harlfinger,754 N.E.2d at 67 (declaring no child shall bring action more

than seven years from date of alleged occurrence, notwithstanding accrual date).
6 See Harlfinger, 754 N.E.2d at 67 (stating despite provisions of tolling statute,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, § 7, minor shall commence action within three years of accrual
date); cf MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, § 7 (2004) (declaring action may be commenced after
disability, such as being a minor, is removed).
7 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, § 4 (Supp. 2004) (stating adult may bring action
within three years from date of accrual); id. (prohibiting adult from bringing action after
seven z'ears from date alleged malpractice occurred).
See infra notes 23-42 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 60-95 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 13-42 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
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correctly
upheld the minority provision of the medical malpractice stat2
ute.'
II.

HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS' MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
STATUTE'S MINORITY PROVISION

In 1975, medical malpractice insurers in Massachusetts threatened
to withdraw from the malpractice market and refused to provide insurance
to physicians. 13 In response, Massachusetts Sen. Daniel J. Foley and Rep.
Raymond LaFontaine introduced "An Act Relative to Medical Malpractice," including among other provisions, a statute of limitations governing
a minor's ability to bring a medical malpractice claim, the stated purpose
of which was to ensure the continued availability of medical malpractice
insurance. 14 The bill's sponsors maintained that insurers were reacting to a
national trend of high settlements and jury awards in medical malpractice
cases, rather than to actual high settlements or jury awards in Massachusetts. 15 At that time, the Massachusetts statute of limitations began to run
when the alleged malpractice occurred, not when it was discovered. 16 As a
result, the sponsors maintained that the Massachusetts statute already re-7
duced the likelihood of delayed claims against physicians and insurers.
Elsewhere, they claimed, the discovery rule caused medical malpractice
insurance crises because no time limit existed in which such discovery
must be made.18
12

See infra notes 60-95 and accompanying text.

13 See Daniel J. Foley & Raymond LaFontaine, Statement concerning An Act Rela-

tive to Medical Malpractice (Jan.-Feb. 1975) (statement available at the Mass. Archives in
the legislative history packet to 1975 Mass. Acts 362) [hereinafter Foley & LaFontaine
Statement] (citing decision of major malpractice insurance carriers to leave malpractice
market by March 1, 1975, which would have inevitably left physicians without insurance).
14 See H. 6315, 1975 Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1975), 1975 Mass. Acts 362 (stating
purpose of Act); Foley & LaFontaine Statement, supra note 13 (noting insurers' threat to
leave medical malpractice market as one reason for bill).
15 See Foley & LaFontaine Statement, supra note 13 (noting average settlement in
1975 in Massachusetts was $12,000).
16 See Pasquale v. Chandler, 215 N.E.2d 319, 321-22 (Mass. 1966) (holding cause of
action accrues at time of malpractice and not at time of discovery); Capucci v. Barone, 165
N.E. 653, 654-55 (Mass. 1929) (refusing to apply discovery rule).
17 See Foley & LaFontaine Statement, supra note 13; see also ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL COMMISSION RELATIVE TO MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE AND
THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, H. 5262, Reg. Sess., at 9

(Mass. 1987).
18 See Foley & LaFontaine Statement, supra note 13; see also Harlfinger v. Martin,
754 N.E.2d 63, 68 (Mass. 2001) (citing legislative history and stating discovery rule does
not place outer limit on time in which plaintiff can bring medical malpractice claim);
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION RELATIVE TO MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE AND THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,

supra note 17 (stating statute of limitations requires plaintiff to bring lawsuit within three
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In 1980, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared in
Franklin v. Albert 9 that a medical malpractice cause of action accrues
when the patient discovers the injury, not when the injury occurs.2 ° In response to Franklin, the Legislature reviewed the medical malpractice statute in 1986 and amended the minority provision to include a seven-year
statute of repose. 2' The statute of repose, unlike the three-year statute of
limitations, begins to run at the time of the alleged malpractice's occurrence, not when a person discovers such alleged malpractice. 22
Since its introduction and enactment in 1975, plaintiffs have made
numerous challenges to the minority provision's constitutionality. 23 In
Plummer v. Gillieson,24 a mother filed suit on behalf of her eight-year-old

years of discovering injury, but places no limit on time period during which plaintiff must
discover such injury).
'9 411 N.E.2d 458 (Mass. 1980).
20 Id. at 461-64 (overruling prior decisions and holding statute of limitations for
medical malpractice statute subject to discovery rule); see also Bowen v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
557 N.E.2d 739, 742 (Mass. 1990) (noting action accrued when plaintiff had knowledge of
harm and cause of harm); Santana v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., 2003 Mass. App. Div.
79, 80 (2003) (recognizing principle that patient should be put on notice before statute bars
claim).
21 See Harlfinger,754 N.E.2d at 68 (asserting statute of repose enactment
in apparent
response to Franklin decision); Plummer v. Gillieson, 692 N.E.2d 528, 530 (Mass. App. Ct.
1998) (stating 1986 amendment is a statute of repose, not limitations, enacted in response to
Franklin); An Act Relative to Medical Malpractice, 1986 Mass. Acts 351, § 23 (amending
minority provision to include statute of repose six years after Supreme Judicial Court decided Franklin); cf. 1986 Mass. Acts 35 1, §§ 29, 30 (amending statute relating to length of
time during which adult can bring medical malpractice action to include same seven-year
statute of repose).
22 See McGuinness v. Cotter, 591 N.E.2d 659, 662 (Mass. 1992) (stating repose
statute runs from "definitely established event," such as date on which act or omission occurred); Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 516 (Mass. 1982) (explaining repose statute
completely eliminates action after specified time runs without considering accrual or discovery); cf Nett v. Bellucci, 774 N.E.2d 130, 136 (Mass. 2002) (holding action commences
when motion for leave to amend was filed).
23 See Harlfinger,754 N.E.2d at 66 (challenging statute under due process and equal
protection guarantees of Federal and State Constitutions); Cioffi v. Guenther, 370 N.E.2d
1003, 1005 (Mass. 1977) (arguing length of time provided for statute to become effective
not long enough); Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at 530 (challenging statute similarly to Harlfinger,
but adding right to remedy claim under Mass. Declaration of Rights, Article 11). The Supreme Judicial Court first reviewed a challenge to section 60D's constitutionality in 1977.
See Cioff, 370 N.E.2d at 1004 (discussing child's and his father's suit against doctor). The
Supreme Judicial Court held that the statute, which did not provide for tolling a minor's
claim until the age of majority, was constitutional because it still provided a reasonable time
in which a minor could bring a medical malpractice action before the statute of limitations
barred it. Id. at 1004-05 (holding six months was reasonable time to commence present
action).
24 692 N.E.2d 528 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
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child for injuries sustained during the child's birth.25 The trial court held
that the seven-year statute of repose embodied in chapter 231, section 60D
of the Massachusetts General Laws barred the suit. 26 On appeal, the appellant (plaintiff below) argued unsuccessfully that the minority provision
violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Federal and
State Constitutions. 27
The appellate court in Plummer first addressed the due process
question and deemed section 60D to be economic and social remedial legislation, that must only survive a rational basis test to be constitutional.2 8
The court rejected the appellant's due process claims on the grounds that
the statute is clear, unambiguous, and no contradiction exists between the
ninth birthday component of the limitations provision and the statute of
repose. 29 The court further held that section 60D did not unconstitutionally
infringe upon the due process rights of plaintiffs under two years of age
because the legislative objective of reducing the cost of medical malpractice insurance and ensuring the availability of affordable health care is rationally related to a statute that limits the duration of liability for both minors and adults.30
25

26
27

Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at 529.
Id. at 530 (stating motion judge granted summary judgment in favor of defendants).
See id. (affirming judgment of lower court). The appellant claimed that the statute

violated the due process clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions because it was "unconstitutionally vague and infringe[d] upon the rights of plaintiffs under the age of two to
seek redress against medical providers." Id. at 531. The statute also violated the equal
protection clauses of the same Constitutions, she argued, because it "treats medical malpractice plaintiffs injured between birth and age two differently than other minor plaintiffs
who are under the age of six and there is no rational basis for this classification." Id. at 532.
The appellant also asserted that the statute violates Article XI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which guarantees one's right to a remedy by recourse to the laws. See id.
Article XI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights states:
Every subject of the commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, by
having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right and
justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and
without any denial; promptly and without delay; comfortably to the laws.
MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XI.
The Plummer court quickly dismissed this claim, however, declaring that Article
XI "has never been construed to grant any person a vested interest in any rule of law entitling such person to insist that it shall remain unchanged." Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at 532
(declaring statutes modifying or abrogating common law rights do not violate Article XI);
cf. Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 522 n.16 (Mass. 1982) (holding Massachusetts Legislature may abolish a common law cause of action by statute without providing substitute
remedy if statute enacted rationally relates to permissible legislative objective).
28 See Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at 531 (stating plaintiff must overcome presumption of
constitutionality and deference to legislature when economic legislation at issue).
29 Id.
30 See id. at 531-32 (holding section 60D rationally related to legitimate state interest
and therefore satisfies due process requirements). The court completed only one due proc-
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With respect to the equal protection claim, the Plummer court applied a rational basis test because the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the
statute burdened a suspect group or fundamental interest. 3' The court held
that the repose provision did not distinguish between minors of any age,
but rather created a classification based upon medical malpractice claims
and other tort actions. 32 As such, a rational basis exists for the classification because it related to the State's interest in reducing the cost of medical
malpractice insurance, thereby ensuring the availability of health care.33
Harifinger v. Martin34 also addressed the constitutionality of the
statute of repose embodied in section 60D.35 The plaintiffs contended that
the statute violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Federal and State Constitutions.36 The court held, as it had three years
earlier in Plummer, that the statute of repose embodied in section 60D was
constitutional. 37 The Harlfinger court also identified the statute as economic regulation and agreed with the Plummer decision that the statute
bore a "reasonable relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose.

38

De-

ess analysis because it determined that the Federal and State Constitutions were very similar. See id. at 531. Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, plaintiff
must prove that the statute does not bear a "reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective." Id.; Klein, 437 N.E.2d at 519 (quoting Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592,
601 (Mass. 1971). Under the Massachusetts Constitution, the plaintiff must prove that the
statute does not bear a "real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, moral, or
some other phase of the general welfare." Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at 531 (quoting Klein, 437
N.E.2d at 519).
31See Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at 532 (maintaining neither age nor type of claim, i.e.
medical malpractice as distinguished from other tort plaintiffs, are suspect groups or fundamental interests, so statute must be upheld if it rationally relates to furtherance of legitimate state interest); see also infra note 80 (describing examples of suspect classes and fundamental rights).
32 See Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at 529, 532 (arguing repose, not limitations, provision
bars case and hinting limitations provision may violate equal protection); id. at 532 (agreeing limitations provision treats minors differently depending on their age, but facts of this
case did not lend themselves to addressing statute of limitations, only statute of repose); see
also infra notes 79-80 (setting forth constitutional test used to analyze each clause and
specifying neither age nor type of claim is suspect class or fundamental interest requiring
application of strict scrutiny).
33 See Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at 532 (holding section 60D satisfies equal protection
requirements of Federal and State Constitutions).
34754 N.E.2d 63 (Mass. 2001).
35 See id. at 66 (stating constitutionality of section 60D is primary issue in case).
36 Id.

37 See id. (affirming judgment of lower court and holding section 60D does not violate due process or equal protection guarantees).
38 See Harifingerv. Martin, 754 N.E.2d 63, 68 (Mass. 2001) (following Plummer).
The court recognized two legitimate legislative purposes in addition to the one that the
Massachusetts Legislature identified in 1975, and held that the statute bore a rational relationship to both. See id. at 68-69. The Massachusetts Legislature identified the purpose as
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spite plaintiffs' argument that the statute of repose has only a "negligible
impact" on the cost of health care, the Supreme Judicial Court stated that it
was not the job of the courts, but
rather that of the legislature, to determine
39
the problem that needs solving.
The plaintiffs in Harlfinger also argued that section 60D violated
the Equal Protection Clause because it distinguished between cases in
which the doctor leaves a foreign object in a person's body and those
where he or she does not.40 The court applied a rational basis test because
the statute did not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right.41 The
court identified the same purposes of the statute of repose as it did in the
due process analysis and stated that a rational basis exists for distinguishing between cases that involve foreign objects and those that do not.n2

addressing the cost and availability of medical malpractice insurance. See id.; see also
supra note 14 and accompanying text. The court also based its decision on "limiting the
duration of liability," which it said was a "well recognized public purpose." Harfinger,
754 N.E.2d at 69 n.8 (quoting Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 520 (Mass. 1982)). The
court listed a third purpose, the difficulty of demonstrating the standard of care from many
years ago, which a statute of repose could remedy. Harfinger,754 N.E.2d at 69 n.8.
39 See Harlfinger,754 N.E.2d at 69 (determining wisdom or effectiveness of statute
not within province of courts).
40 Id. at 72 (arguing unlike other medical malpractice claims, foreign object claims
not subject to repose statute).
41 Id. (reiterating statute must rationally relate to furtherance of legitimate state interest). The court explained, "'If there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification,' the classification will survive an equal protection challenge." Id. (quoting Chebacco Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 711 N.E.2d 135, 137 (Mass. 1999), in turn quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). The court refused to apply a higher level of scrutiny based upon the statute's implication of children's rights and distinguished other states'
cases that applied such a standard. See Harlfinger,754 N.E.2d at 73, 74 n.17 (maintaining
challenged classification not based upon age, and distinction does not uniquely affect children).
In addition, the court declined to apply out-of-state cases in which courts struck
down limitations and repose statutes because those decisions were often based on a higher
standard of scrutiny derived from those states' constitutions, not the rational basis test applied in a due process or equal protection analysis. See Harlfinger,754 N.E.2d at 70 (citing
numerous decisions striking down similar statutes as unconstitutional, only one on due
process grounds); infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text (distinguishing between
Harifingerand other equal protection cases involving higher standard of scrutiny).
42 See Harlfinger,754 N.E.2d at 72 (explaining foreign object cases do not encounter
same issues as those not involving such objects). For example, problems of proving malpractice and changes in the standard of care do not affect foreign object cases, thereby
eliminating the need for a statute of repose. See id.
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III. OTHER STATES' REASONS FOR STRIKING DOWN SIMILAR
STATUTES
In 1983, the Supreme Court of Texas was the first state supreme
43
court to hold a medical malpractice minority provision unconstitutional.
In Sax v. Votteler,44 the court ruled that Texas' minority provision violated
the Texas Constitution's open courts provision.45 Later that same year, the
Supreme Court of Ohio overturned a similar statute in Schwan v. Riverside
Methodist Hospital46 and held the state's minority provision unconstitutional on the basis that it violated the Equal Protection Clause in the Ohio
Constitution. 47 The Ohio court held that the statute created an irrational
classification in treating medical malpractice victims younger than age ten
differently from those who are older than ten, but still minors. 48
In Mominee v. Scherbarth,4 9 the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed its
decision in Schwan, holding the minority provision unconstitutional.5 ° In
contrast to Schwan, however, the court resolved Mominee on due process
grounds, holding that the statute violated the due process and due course of
law provisions in the Ohio Constitution. 5' The court's reasoning focused
on the defendants' lack of evidence relating to the number of minors'
medical malpractice claims and the effect of such claims on insurance
43 See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1983) (holding limitations provision violated Texas Constitution).
44 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
45 Id. at 664 (identifying open courts provision as due process guarantee). The court
held that the statute of limitations in the minority provision was unconstitutional because it
unreasonably prevented a minor from seeking redress for negligently caused injuries. See
id. at 667; see also id. at 665-66 (determining legislature cannot abrogate common law
cause of action without surviving balancing test). In deciding Sax, the justices relied upon
state due process grounds rather than state equal protection grounds, federal due process or
federal equal protection grounds because they believed the Texas Constitution afforded its
citizens additional rights. Id. at 664.
46 452 N.E.2d 1337 (Ohio 1983).
47 See Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 452 N.E.2d 1337, 1338 (Ohio 1983)
(applying rational basis test and ruling statute violates Ohio Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause).
48 id. at 1339 (holding any classification based on age other than age of majority
irrational); see also infra note 91 and accompanying text (specifying one year statute of
limitations for minors older than ten, but four or more years to bring action for minors
younger than ten).
9 503 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio 1986).

Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717, 720 (Ohio 1986) (recognizing Schwan's
holding of unconstitutionality based upon equal protection, not due process grounds).
51 See id. at 721 (stating statute fails rational basis test because it does not bear a real
and substantial relationship to its stated purposes of ensuring the continued delivery of
health care and reducing medical malpractice insurance premiums); supra note 50; see also
id. at 720-22 (applying same constitutional test as under Massachusetts Constitution, but
striking down statute in Ohio).
50
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premiums. 52 In Mominee, Chief Justice Celebrezze's concurrence relied
upon language from the Missouri Supreme Court in Strahler v. St. Luke's
Hospital,53 stating, "[T]he method employed by the legislature to battle any
escalating economic and social costs connected with medical malpractice
litigation exacts far too high a price from minor plaintiffs. 54 The Supreme
Court of Missouri in Strahlerheld the state's medical malpractice minority
provision unconstitutional on the basis that it violated the Missouri Constitution's provision guaranteeing a citizen's right of access to the courts.55
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Carson v. Maurer56 overturned the state's medical malpractice minority provision on equal protection grounds.57 The Carson court applied a higher standard of review than
rational basis even though the statute did not involve a suspect class or
fundamental right.58 The court held that the statute, which only applied the
discovery rule to cases where the doctor left a foreign object in the plaintiffs body, did not substantially relate to the legislative objective of controlling the rising costs of medical malpractice liability insurance.5 9
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL TESTS: IS
MASSACHUSETTS' STATUTE CONSTITUTIONAL?
Plaintiffs have attempted to challenge Massachusetts' minority provision under the due process and equal protection clauses embodied in the
State and Federal Constitutions. 60 The following sections analyze each
52

See id. at 721 (citing lack of evidence as reason relationship between statute and

goal not substantial).
5' 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986).
54 See Mominee, 503 N.E.2d at 724 (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring) (quoting Strahler v.
St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7, 12 (Mo. 1986)).
55 See Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7, 11-12 (Mo. 1986) (overturning
statute because it makes minors dependent on others to assert claims, thereby requiring
minors to forfeit such claims if not brought within statutory period).
56 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980).
57 See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 833 (N.H. 1980) (holding statute invalid
because it distinguishes between cases that involve foreign objects and those that do not,
and makes discovery rule unavailable to plaintiffs without foreign object claims).
58 See id. at 830-31 (stating right to recover for injuries not fundamental, but
important). The court evaluated the statute under a two-part analysis: the classifications "must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation." Id. at 831 (italics in original) (applying
more rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed under rational basis test).
59 See id. at 834 (ruling statute unconstitutional because no basis for denying discovery rule to minors without foreign object claims, given that number of claims brought by
them relatively small).
60 See Harlfinger v. Martin, 754 N.E.2d 63, 66 (Mass. 2001) (challenging statute
under federal and state due process and equal protection provisions); Plummer v. Gillieson,
692 N.E.2d 528, 530 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (challenging statute under federal and state due
process and equal protection provisions); supra notes 23-42 (citing cases in which plaintiffs
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issue separately and argue that Massachusetts' minority provision should
continue to survive due process and equal protection challenges brought
under both State and Federal Constitutions.6 '
A. Due Process
When conducting a due process analysis, a court must first determine whether to apply the rational basis test or a higher standard of review
based on whether the legislation is of an economic matter.62 The Supreme
Judicial Court has correctly identified Massachusetts' minority provision
63
as economic legislation and thus within the police power of the state.
Therefore, Massachusetts courts have correctly employed the rational basis
test to determine the minority provision's validity under the Due Process
Clause. 64
A court must uphold economic legislation under the Massachusetts
Constitution if it bears a "real and substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or some other phase of the general welfare. 65 Under the
United States Constitution, however, the Supreme Court has phrased the
test differently, mandating that a court uphold a statute if it bears a "reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective. 66 Because public

have challenged section 60D under state and federal due process and equal protection); see
also Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at 532 (challenging Massachusetts statute under right to remedy
provision embodied in Declaration of Rights).
61 See infra notes 62-95 and accompanying text.
62 See Harlfinger, 754 N.E.2d at 68 n.7 (explaining due process analysis occurs
within area of economic regulation); Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at 531 (determining first that
statute represented economic legislation, then applying rational basis test).
63 See Foley & LaFontaine Statement, supra note 13 (describing bill as addressing
cost and availability of insurance); supra note 38 (identifying purpose as addressing cost
and availability of medical malpractice insurance); supra note 62 (citing cases describing
statute as being within area of economic regulation); infra text accompanying notes 69-70
(articulating reasons statute falls within state's police power).
"4 See Harlfinger,754 N.E.2d at 68 (applying rational basis test to challenged economic legislation that does not infringe on any fundamental right); Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at
531 (stating plaintiff must satisfy rational basis test to prove due process violation); supra
notes 62-63 and accompanying text (recognizing minority provision as economic legislation
and applying rational basis test).
Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Mass. 1982) (quoting Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Director of the Div. on the Necessaries of Life, 30 N.E.2d 269, 274-75 (Mass.
1940)) (noting rational basis test for due process challenge under Massachusetts Constitution); Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at 531 (clarifying appropriate constitutional test in due process
analysis under Massachusetts Constitution).
66 Klein, 437 N.E.2d at 519 (quoting Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 601 (Mass.
1971)) (stating test for due process challenge under United States Constitution); See
Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at 531 (declaring rational basis test in Federal Constitution due process challenge).
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health, safety, morals, or some other phase of the general welfare are permissible legislative objectives, the key language in these tests is the relationship that the statute must bear to those objectives: a "real and substantial relation" under the Massachusetts Constitution and a "reasonable relationship" under the Federal Constitution. 67 As a practical matter, in the
area of economic regulation, there is little difference between the state and
federal standards. 68
The Massachusetts Legislature passed the "Act Relative to Medical
Malpractice" in an effort to address the nationwide medical malpractice
crisis during the 1970s that caused insurance companies in Massachusetts
to threaten to withdraw from the medical malpractice market. 69 As such,
the Legislature maintains that the Act's objectives are to reduce the cost of
medical malpractice insurance and to ensure the continued availability of
health care to Massachusetts' citizens.7 0 These7 objectives are legitimate. 71
The statute passes the constitutional test because limiting the time in which
a medical malpractice action can be brought reduces the actual number of
medical malpractice claims absorbed by insurance companies, thereby
easing the cost of medical malpractice insurance for physicians. 72 Fur67

See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (articulating separate rational basis

tests under State and Federal Constitutions); supra note 30 & infra note 71 and accompanying text (ensuring availability of health care is a permissible legislative objective); see also
Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Bd. of Registration in Embalming and Funeral Directing, 398
N.E.2d 471, 475 (Mass. 1979) (emphasizing presumption of constitutionality).
68 Harlfinger,754 N.E.2d at 68 n.7 (quoting Klein, 437 N.E.2d at 519 n.6) (applying
one rational basis standard because of similarity between federal and state standards); see
Chebacco Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n, 711 N.E.2d 135, 138
(Mass. 1999) (applying same minimal standard for both federal and state due process provision challenges); Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc., 398 N.E.2d at 475 n.8 (explaining any difference between two standards within area of economic regulation narrow); Plummer, 692
N.E.2d at 531 (quoting Klein, 437 N.E.2d at 519 n.6) (stating there exists little difference
between two standards).
69 See Foley & LaFontaine Statement, supra note 13; see also supra notes 13, 14 &
15 and accompanying text (introducing Act and its purposes); infra note 70 and accompanying text.
70 See Harlfinger, 754 N.E.2d at 69 (stating purposes to limit cost of medical malpractice insurance and sustain its availability and affordability); Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at
531-32 (same); Foley & LaFontaine Statement, supra note 13; see also supra text accompanying notes 14, 30 & 38 (articulating purposes of Act).
71 See Harlfinger, 754 N.E.2d at 69 (holding objectives "surely permissible");
Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at 532 (declaring state interests legitimate); see also Mominee v.
Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717, 721 (Ohio 1986) (holding Ohio's goals, which are identical to
Massachusetts' goals, are proper).
72 See Harlfinger,754 N.E.2d at 69 (declaring establishing definitive endpoint to time
in which minors can bring medical malpractice actions bears rational relationship to curbing
cost of medical malpractice insurance); see also supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text
(proclaiming section 60D limits time in which minor can bring medical malpractice action);
supra note 70 and accompanying text (stating one legislative objective to reduce cost of
medical malpractice insurance to physicians).
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thermore, if physicians can afford the cost of medical malpractice insurance, they will be more likely to continue practicing, and ensure the availability of their services to the community.73
Courts in other states have struck down similar statutes on due
process grounds by either applying a higher standard of review or by asserting that limiting the time during which a minor can bring a medical
malpractice action does not rationally relate to the respective legislature's
objectives.7 4 One court cited the absence of legislative findings on the
number and effect of minors' medical malpractice claims as evidence of its
decision to hold the state's minority provision unconstitutional. 75 In cases
concerning economic legislation, however, a court must accord significant
deference to the legislature in solving the problem at hand.76 A court must
not exceed its boundaries and question the legislature's judgment, especially where the law furthers an economic end.77
B. Equal Protection
The constitutional analysis for an equal protection challenge varies
significantly from a due process inquiry, although the test's language re-

73 See Harlfinger,754 N.E.2d at 69 (declaring statutes of limitation and repose effectively ensure availability of health care in Massachusetts); see also supra notes 1-6 and
accompanying text (specifying statutes of limitation and repose embodied within section
60D); supra note 70 and accompanying text (stating legislative objective of ensuring that
health care is available and affordable).
74 See Mominee, 503 N.E.2d at 721 (holding no evidence to prove rational relationship and therefore statute violated due process); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex.
1983) (overturning minority provision by applying open courts-due process test, not rational
basis); supra notes 45, 50 & 51 and accompanying text (elaborating on cases in which
Texas and Ohio Supreme Courts held statutes unconstitutional).
75 See Mominee, 503 N.E.2d at 721 (citing lack of evidence as reason constitutional
test failed and statute violated Due Process Clause); supra note 52 and accompanying text
(same).
76 See Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Bd. of Registration in Embalming and Funeral
Directing, 398 N.E.2d 471, 475 (Mass. 1979) (explaining statute justifiable by any conceivable set of facts or findings); id. (noting legislative deference not a result of judiciary abdicating its responsibility, but rather respect for policy decisions of popularly elected legislature); Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 609 (Mass. 1971) (applying rational basis test to
equal 7protection challenge and noting legislative findings unnecessary).
7 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970) (asserting federal courts
do not possess power to impose upon states their views of economic policy); Williamson v.
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (concluding Supreme Court cannot use Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause to strike down state laws regulating business and industry because they may be "unwise, improvident or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought"); Harlfinger,754 N.E.2d at 69 (quoting Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 519
(Mass. 1982)) (articulating principle "whether [the statute is] wise or effective is not, of
course, within the province of [courts]").
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mains similar.7 8 In an equal protection case, a court must first determine
whether a distinction or classification embodied in the statute involves a
suspect class or a fundamental right, whereas the initial inquiry in a due
process context is whether the legislation as a whole, not a classification
within it, represents economic legislation. 79 After the court answers the
initial question in an equal protection case, it applies the appropriate constitutional test: rational basis scrutiny if the statute does not burden a suspect class or a fundamental right, strict scrutiny if it does, or middle-tier
scrutiny if the statute distinguishes on the basis of gender or illegitimacy.8 °
The Massachusetts minority provision neither involves a suspect
class nor a fundamental right.8' The statute does distinguish on the basis of
age, the nature of the claim, and whether a doctor leaves a foreign object in
the patient's body.82 None of these distinctions, however, require a court
78 See infra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining similarities and differences
between due process and equal protection analyses).
79 See Harlfinger,754 N.E.2d at 72 (identifying preliminarily that distinction at issue
involves neither suspect classification nor fundamental right); Chebacco Liquor Mart, Inc.
v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 711 N.E.2d 135, 136 (Mass. 1999) (noting plaintiff not member of suspect group nor burdened by fundamental interest, then analyzing
statute under rational basis test); Plummer v. Gillieson, 692 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1998) (determining first that statute burdens neither suspect group nor fundamental
interest, then applying rational basis); see also supra note 62 and accompanying text (describing due process inquiry as first determining whether statute represents economic legislation, and if so, applying rational basis).
80 See supra note 79 (providing examples where courts applied rational basis test
because statute did not burden suspect class or fundamental interest). The rational basis test
imparts the lowest level of scrutiny and affords the most deference to the state legislature's
decision. See infra text accompanying note 84 (denoting rational basis test). In contrast,
strict scrutiny allows the least amount of deference to the legislature and provides that a
statute will be held unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to effectuate a compelling
state interest. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (explaining
statute distinguishing on basis of race is subject to strict scrutiny); see also Carson v.
Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (N.H. 1980) (stating suspect classifications include race,
alienage or nationality). Statutes involving gender-based classifications are subject to middle-tier scrutiny, which the Supreme Court applies with more vigor than rational basis, but
with less than strict scrutiny. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 523-24 (1996)
(quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)) (holding gender
classification must serve "important governmental objectives" and discriminatory means
employed must be "substantially related" to achieving objectives); see also Carson, 424
A.2d at 831 (applying middle-tier scrutiny under State Constitution for classification based
on medical malpractice and other tort plaintiffs even though United States Supreme Court
restricted its use to gender and illegitimacy cases).
81 See supra note 79 (describing Massachusetts cases in which Supreme Judicial
Court held section 60D does not involve suspect class or fundamental right).
82 See Harlfinger,754 N.E.2d at 72 (recognizing statute distinguishes between cases
involving foreign objects and those that do not); Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at 532 (noting statute singles out medical malpractice claimants from plaintiffs in all other tort actions); see
also infra note 89 and accompanying text (arguing various classifications within section
60D pass equal protection rational basis test).
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to raise the level of review above rational basis. 83 Therefore, the Supreme
Judicial Court correctly employed the lowest level of scrutiny in Harlfinger and Plummer, where it examined whether the minority provision's
classifications are "rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate
[s]tate interest. 84 The rational basis test assumes a strong presumption of
validity, and a statute will fail only if it is wholly irrational.85
The Legislature intended to address two issues in passing the Act
Relative to Medical Malpractice: controlling the cost of medical malpractice insurance and ensuring the uninterrupted delivery of health care to
Massachusetts citizens.86 The Supreme Judicial Court recognized a third
state interest as establishing some definitive endpoint for medical malpractice claims, but the court misunderstood the difference between the state's87
interests and the means by which the legislature addressed those interests.
Establishing a definitive endpoint, by enacting a statute of limitation and a
statute of repose, is exactly how the Massachusetts Legislature addresses
the two above interests; it is not an additional interest. 8 Notwithstanding
the Supreme Judicial Court's third purpose, the statute satisfies the rational
basis test because the classifications at issue rationally relate to the legislature's objectives of reducing the cost of medical malpractice insurance and
ensuring continued availability of health care in Massachusetts.89
83 See supra notes 79 & 82 and accompanying text (explaining such classifications do
not involve suspect groups or fundamental interests, so no need for strict scrutiny).

84 See Harlfinger, 754 N.E.2d at 72 (quoting Carter v. Bowie, 736 N.E.2d 385,
388
(Mass. 2000) (articulating rational basis test for equal protection challenge brought under
Massachusetts Constitution); Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at 532 (applying rational basis test
because statute does not burden suspect class or fundamental interest). The same rational
basis test applies if the challenge arises from an alleged violation of the United States Constitution. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (upholding
statute if any reasonably conceivable state of facts could provide rational basis for classification); Chebacco Liquor Mart, Inc., 711 N.E.2d at 137 (asserting same equal protection
standard under Federal and State Constitutions).
85 See Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 609 (Mass. 1971) (stating Equal Protection
Clause only prohibits legislature from making "arbitrary or irrational" classifications); see
also Cundiff v. Daviess County Hosp., 656 N.E.2d 298, 302 (Ind. 1995) (ordering courts to
exercise deference to legislature when conducting equal protection analysis of minority
provision).
86 See Foley & LaFontaine Statement, supra note 13; see also supra text accompanying note 30 (describing statute's objectives); supra note 70 and accompanying text (same).
87 See Harlfinger, 754 N.E.2d at 69 (quoting Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 520
(Mass. 1982)) (adding purpose of limiting duration of medical malpractice liability).
88 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (describing operation of section 60D);
supra text accompanying note 14 (introducing statute of limitations to ensure availability of
medical malpractice insurance); supra note 21 and accompanying text (introducing statute
of repose to further limit time during which minors allowed to bring medical malpractice
actions).
89 See Plummer, 692 N.E.2d at 532 (explaining distinction between medical malprac-
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The state supreme courts that have held minority provisions unconstitutional have properly done so because the corresponding state legislatures did create irrational classifications in the respective statutes. 90 For
example, in Schwan, the Ohio statute outlined a system whereby a minor
under age ten had until age fourteen to bring a medical malpractice action,
but anyone older than ten, including adults, had only one year to do so.91
Massachusetts' minority provision, unlike Ohio's, does not provide for
different statutes of limitations depending on a child's age, but rather a
three year statute of limitations for everyone,
including adults, and until
92
age nine for those younger than age six.

In addition, the Carson court properly struck down New Hamp-

shire's minority provision on equal protection grounds because applying
the discovery rule to some cases and not to others did not at all relate to
reducing the cost of medical malpractice insurance.9 3 The Massachusetts
statute, however, does not create this distinction because the discovery rule
applies to all medical malpractice cases. 94 Furthermore, the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied a middle-tier scrutiny to the statute because it
considered the right to recover for injuries an important substantive right,
although not a fundamental one requiring strict scrutiny.9 5

tice and other torts constitutional because state is reducing medical malpractice insurance
cost). In Harfinger,the Supreme Judicial Court avoids the equal protection analysis by
stating that foreign object cases are not similarly situated to all other medical malpractice
actions, and therefore need not be treated alike. See Harlfinger,754 N.E.2d at 72 (justifying foreign object exception because problems of proof and standard of care changes do not
plague such cases).
90 See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text (describing reasons for irrational
classifications).
91 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(A), (B) (1975) (denoting one year statute of
limitations for minors older than ten, but at least four years to bring action if minor younger
than ten); Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717, 719-20 (Ohio 1986) (outlining specifics
of statutory scheme); Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 452 N.E.2d 1337, 1338 (Ohio
1983) (describing statute).
92 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60D (2000) (denoting three year statute of limitations and same three year difference between ages six and nine); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.11 (A), (B) (1975) (specifying one year statute of limitations for minors older than ten,
but four or more years to bring action for minors younger than age ten); see also McGuinness v. Cotter, 591 N.E.2d 659, 663 (Mass. 1992) (clarifying purpose of ninth birthday
provision to afford younger plaintiffs additional time to bring action).
93 See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 834 (N.H. 1980) (denying constitutionality of
minority provision because statute did not substantially further statute's objectives); see
also supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (describing New Hampshire Supreme
Court's reasoning in Carson).
94 See Harfinger, 754 N.E.2d at 73 (explaining discovery rule applicable whether
malpractice based upon foreign object exception or not).
95 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (describing Carson); see also supra
notes 80 & 93 (describing reasons for New Hampshire's statute failing middle-tier scrutiny
and those for not applying strict scrutiny).
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CONCLUSION

Times have changed. In 1975, the sponsors of the Act Relative to
Medical Malpractice determined that insurers' apprehension about providing coverage in Massachusetts was due to a national trend of high jury
awards and settlements. The trend had not yet materialized in Massachusetts at that time, but today high jury awards and settlements in the Commonwealth are placing significant pressure on insurers. Massachusetts
Lawyers Weekly reported that in 2003, juries awarded damages of $3.18
million and $1.8 million. 96 In addition, the article reported eighteen settlements: one each for $3.75 million and $3.25 million, eight between $2
million and $3 million, and eight between $1 million and $2 million." 97
During 2004, one of the medical liability insurers in the state, Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company (MLMIC), discontinued insurance policies of more than 1,600 physicians in Massachusetts. 98 The pressure on
insurance companies remains a critical problem.
The Massachusetts Legislature attempted to resolve this issue thirty
years ago. It enacted the current statute, including the statutes of limitations and repose, to allow physicians to continue providing health care to
the public. Should the Massachusetts Legislature decide to reexamine the
Act in light of the recent changes in the medical malpractice liability market and in response to pressure from the medical community and others
lobbying in favor of tort reform, it should not materially alter the minority
provision. The American Medical Association does not suggest that limiting a minor's right to sue for medical malpractice would significantly affect the medical liability crisis. Rather, the Massachusetts Legislature
96Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, Jan. 19, 2004, availableat
http://www.massmed.org/pages/ma liability-crisis_061404.asp.
97The American Medical Association recently determined, however, that Massachusetts is a "state in crisis," the level sustaining the highest degree of problems arising from
the "medical liability crisis" throughout the United States. See American Medical Association, America's Medical Liability Crisis: A National View, available at http://www.amaassn.org/ama/noindex/category/l 187 l.html (portraying states in America "in crisis," "showing problem signs" and those "currently okay"); American Medical Association, America's
Medical Liability Crisis Backgrounder-Massachusetts, available at http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/category/12591.html (describing factors leading to exigency of Massachusetts' medical liability crisis, including inter alia the inadequacy of $500,000 cap on
non-economic damages, large jury awards, and a malpractice liability insurer recently leaving Massachusetts market). Just one year ago, Massachusetts appeared in the "showing
problem signs" category. See American Medical Association, America's Medical Liability
Crisis: A National View, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mn/1/med liab 19stat.pdf.
98 American Medical Association, America's Medical Liability Crisis Backgrounder-Massachusetts, availableat http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/
12591.html.
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should modify other statutes governing medical malpractice that would
have a greater impact on the desired outcome. Section 60D provides stability for insurers and physicians by reducing the risk of expensive litigation and excessive jury awards and settlements many years after a minor's
injury occurs.
The minority provision of the Act Relative to Medical Malpractice
is constitutional. Due process and equal protection challenges have been
unsuccessful because the statute is an economic regulation that does not
burden a suspect class or fundamental right. Accordingly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has appropriately applied the respective rational basis tests and has properly decided the cases before it. Therefore,
future patients who wish to increase the time that they have to bring medical malpractice actions may find a more sympathetic audience in the Legislature than in the courts.
Natalie H. Mantell

